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Abstract
What does logic tells us how about we ought to reason? If P entails Q, and I believe P,
should I believe Q? I will argue that we should embed the issue in an independently
motivated contextualist semantics for ‘ought’, with parameters for a standard and set
of propositions. With the contextualist machinery in hand, we can defend a strong
principle expressing how agents ought to reason while accommodating conflicting
intuitions. I then show how our judgments about blame and guidance can be handled
by this machinery.
Keywords Ought-contextualism · Reasoning · Inferences
1 Introduction
What does logic tells us how about we ought to reason? If P entails Q, and you believe
P, should you believe Q? There seem to be cases where you should not, for example,
if you have evidence against Q, or the inference is not worth making. So we need
a theory telling us when an inference ought to be made, and when not. I will argue
that we should embed the issue in an independently motivated contextualist semantics
for ‘ought’. With the contextualist machinery in hand we can give a theory of when
inferences should be made and when not.
Section 2 explains the background and the main problems connecting logic with
norms of reasoning. Section 3 explains the two parameters we need for contextualism
about ‘ought’—a set of live possibilities and a standard. Section 4 discusses the objec-
tion from belief revision (this and the other problems will be explained in Sect. 2) and
argues that it can be solved by using the set of live possibilities, as can the preface
paradox (Sect. 5) and the problem of excessive demands (Sect. 6). Section 7 discusses
the problem of clutter avoidance and argues that it can be solved by using the rele-
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vant standard. Section 8 discusses the implications for blame and guidance. Section 9
concludes.
2 Background
What is the relation between logic and reasoning? For example, suppose an agent
believes that P. Suppose also that Q is a logical consequence of P, but leave open
whether the agent believes that Q is a logical consequence of P.1 Should the agent
infer that Q? (To fill out the example, P might be ‘it’s raining and if it’s raining then
it’s wet’ and Q might be ‘it’s wet’.)
A useful starting point is that logic ‘prescribe[s] universally how one ought to think’
(Frege 1893/1903/2009, p. 15). This suggests that the agent ought to believe Q. We
might try to capture the idea with the following norm:2
Strong Normativity Thesis
For all agents S, and propositions P and Q:
If P entails Q, and S believes P, then S ought to believe Q
(The reason for calling it ‘strong’ will emerge just below).3
Various purported counter-examples have been given (Harman 1986, Field 2009,
2015, MacFarlane ms) based around four main problems:4
Belief Revision
The agent might have strong evidence against Q. If so, they should surely revise
their belief that P, rather than believe Q.5
The Preface Paradox
Suppose S rationally believes each of the assertions in his book, P1, P2…Pn. Let
Q stand for the conjunction, P1 &P2…&Pn. Q is entailed by the author’s beliefs.
But surely, since the author regards himself as fallible, he should not believe the
conjunction of all his assertions.6
1 I follow the literature in assuming that logical consequence is not dependent on thought, reasoning, or
minds (see Prawitz 2005). Other than that, any variety of logical consequence can be plugged in. See
Steinberger (2019b) for discussion. Modus ponens is the standard example, but what I say is intended to
generalize to other deductive principles, and, mutatis mutandis, to inductive principles.
2 I take conditionals like this to be material conditionals. It is a narrow-scope requirement.
3 Part of the reason is to distinguish it from Steinberger’s (2019a) similar but not obviously identical
‘Normativity Thesis’.
4 One problem I won’t discuss is the explosion caused by inconsistent beliefs (Allo 2016, Steinberger
2016). I don’t think contextualism can solve this problem. I suspect the solution is to limit the antecedent
of the norm to mental states more basic than beliefs, such as experiences, but that is a topic for another
paper. Also, the problems above are based on cases where the agent fails to make a valid inference. There
are mirror-image cases where agents do make inferences which are invalid e.g. Pascal’s wager. I leave the
extension of this framework to such cases for future work.
5 I take this to be the same as the ‘bootstrapping problem’ (see Broome 2013, Sect. 5.3; Gibbons 2013,
p. 32), or at least has the same solution. .
6 See Makinson (1965). This is similar to the lottery paradox (Kyburg 1961) but I leave a discussion of the




Some consequences of an agent’s beliefs are too complicated for them to work
out. For example, Fermat’s Last Theorem follows from the rules of arithmetic.
But surely most humans who know the rules of arithmetic have no obligation to
believe Fermat’s Last Theorem.
Clutter Avoidance
Some consequences of an agent’s belief are too uninteresting to beworthworking
out. For example, an agent might be able to infer that either grass is green or
Elvis lives on the moon, using disjunction introduction. But surely they have no
obligation to make such an inference, and might be irrational for doing so.
One reaction to these problems is to weaken the Strong Normativity Thesis. To see
how this might be done, it is helpful to reviewMacFarlane’s taxonomy of three choice-
points:
1. Type of deontic operator. Do facts about logical validity give rise to strict obliga-
tions, permissions, or reasons for belief? Does the agent have
i. a requirement/obligation to believe Q
ii. permission to believe Q
iii. a reason to believe Q?
2. Polarity. Are these obligations/permissions/reasons to
i. believe
ii. not to disbelieve?
3. Scope of deontic operator. Does the deontic operator govern:
i. the consequent of the conditional (if S believes P then S ought to believe Q)
ii. both the antecedent and the consequent (if S ought to believe P then S ought
to believe Q)
iii. the whole conditional (S ought to believe that if P then Q))?
For each choice-point, the options described move roughly7 from more demanding to
less demanding. For example, a norm that says agents are required to believe Q is more
demanding than a norm that says agents merely have permission to believe Q. The
Strong Normativity Thesis takes the first, and most demanding, on all three choice-
points. It says that agents have a requirement rather than a permission or reason, that the
requirement is to believe rather than merely not disbelieve (which includes suspension
of belief), and that the requirement attaches to only the consequent.8 The existing
literature largely considers weakening the Strong Normativity Thesis by moving to
these other choice-points.9 But I don’t think these choice points are the right places
to weaken the link between logic and reasoning.
7 I add ‘roughly’ because it’s not obvious that having permission is stronger than having a reason.
8 See Schroeder (2004), Kolodny (2005) and Finlay (2014, pp. 52–53) for arguments against the wide-
scope solution. See Titelbaum (2015) for references and discussion of the logical relations between wide
and narrow scope norms.
9 See Steinberger (forthcoming a, c) for discussions based on these choice-points.
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I think we need a different way to weaken the Strong Normativity Thesis—the key
is that ‘ought’ is context-sensitive, and the Strong Normativity Thesis is true only with
a particular sense of ‘ought’. I will explain this in the next section, then show how the
counter-examples are avoided.
Eight quick clarifications (impatient readers can skip to the next section): First, I
take reasoning to be a process of transitioning between beliefs. Beyond that I remain
neutral on what reasoning is.10
Second, I remain neutral on the existence and nature of other epistemic norms in
the area e.g. norms of belief (Fassio 2019), norms that agents should collect more
evidence (Friedman forthcoming) etc.
Third, I remain neutral on whether norms of reasoning are fundamental or derived
from more fundamental synchronic norms (Hedden 2015).
Fourth, I will focus on deductive inferences rather than inductive inferences. I think
my account can be extended to inductive inferences, but do not do so here.
Fifth, I take ‘reasoning’ to mean the same as ‘inferring’. The latter is useful for
talking about individual inferences,which is amore natural locution than ‘an individual
act of reasoning’.
Sixth, I will use ‘correct’, ‘bad’ and ‘good’ only as normative terms, and use ‘valid’
for logical relations.
Seventh, I will assume that there can be epistemic reason to believe, and to make
(or not to make) an inference to a belief.11 I will assume that an inference is a type of
action, so there can also be practical reason to make (or not to make) an inference. I
will remain neutral onwhether there can be practical reasons to believe and onwhether
epistemic reasons are fundamental or are ultimately grounded in practical reason.12
Finally, I take there to be a close connection between ‘ought’, ‘should’, ‘good’ and
‘reasons’. Specifically, I assume that ‘what one should do’ is synonymous with ‘what
one ought to do’, ‘what one has most reason to do’ and ‘what is good’ (Shafer-Landau
2005; Broome 2013; Berker 2018). I will focus on contextualism about ‘ought’, but I
take this to have straight-forward implications for contextualism about other normative
terms (Finlay 2014).13 I remain neutral on which if any is fundamental.
3 Two parameters
Suppose Napoleon, an eighteen century general, and Heimson, a twentieth century
schizophrenic, utter the same sentence: ‘I am Napoleon’. There is a sense in which ‘I’
10 Valaris (2019) argues that ‘reasoning’ is ambiguous between cases where the agent believes the proposi-
tions and cases where the agent is working out the consequences of propositions under supposition. I follow
the literature in talking about cases where the agent believes the propositions, but my arguments apply to
cases where the propositions are merely supposed.
11 See Singer and Aronowitz (forthcoming) for the view that there can be epistemic reason to do pretty
much anything.
12 See Cowie (2014), Woods and Maguire (forthcoming).
13 My arguments do not need contextualism, they just need some way of putting the parameters into the




means the same thing in both utterances. This type of meaning can be thought of as a
rule picking out whoever is speaking; this is the character (Perry 1979; Kaplan 1989).
And there is a sense in which ‘I’ means different things in each utterance, Napoleon
and Heimson respectively; this is the content. So the content of any utterance of ‘I’
depends on a parameter—the speaker. We can make the parameter explicit by adding
to the text who ‘I’ is relative to e.g. ‘I-Napoleon’ or ‘I-Heimson’.
An analogous view regarding ‘ought’ has become increasingly popular.14 In fact
it is plausible that there are at least two15 parameters needed to fix the content of a
sentence including ‘ought’—a standard and a set of live possibilities. In this section I
will explain the view, and also separate the core commitments from stronger positions
we need not be committed to.
3.1 Propositions/possible worlds
The first parameter is a modal base which determines a proposition or set of live
possible worlds.16 The live worlds are those compatible with the modal base. If the
modal base is empty then all worlds are live. As the modal base grows, the set of live
worlds is restricted. On the standard theory of modals (Kratzer 1981), ‘it must be that
p’ means, roughly, that in all the live worlds, p.
This parameter is often called the ‘information set’, but using information here is
too restrictive, for two reasons. The first reason is that information is naturally taken
to imply truth. However, it will be important that agents can make good inferences
from false beliefs.17 We can allow that the modal base consists of the beliefs of the
subject of the sentence, or the speaker, or some third party, or the collective beliefs of
a group, or the propositions known by any of the former, or any of these plus a number
of fixed propositions, and endless further options.
The second reason is novel. I think information is too restrictive because the param-
eter needs to vary with the agent’s abilities, not just their information. What one ought
to do depends on what possibilities you can bring about in the future.18 To motivate
this, suppose you are on the beach and see someone struggling in the water. Whether
you ought to dive in depends on whether you can swim. ‘You ought to dive in given
that you can swim’ is true while ‘you ought to dive in given that you cannot swim’
is false. In a context in which you can swim, performing the rescue yourself is a live
14 SeeWedgwood (2006, 2007: ch. 5, 2016); Brogaard (2008); Kolodny andMacFarlane (2010), Björnsson
and Finlay (2010); Dowell (2012, 2013), Charlow (2013), Cariani et al. (2013), Carr (2015), Chrisman
(2015), Silk (2017), Khoo and Knobe (2018), Worsnip (2019a). This work is strongly influenced by Kratzer
(1981, 1991, 2012). For earlier forerunners of contextualism in metaethics see Geach (1956), Foot (1972),
Harman (1975, 1996) and Dreier (1990).
15 Finlay (2014, 2016) argues that only a single parameter is needed. For convenience I will help myself
to the more profligate and familiar theory.
16 I will take for granted that propositions can be modelled by possible worlds, and use propositions and
possible worlds interchangeably.
17 The standard semantics assumed factivity. Finlay (2014) uses ‘information’ but without intending fac-
tivity (personal communication). See Nebel (2019) for a discussion of the factivity of reasons. .
18 For an ‘ought’ relativized to the beliefs of the subject, what they ought to do depends on, not just the
possible ways they believe the world might be in the present and past, but what possibilities they believe








Fig. 1 Live possibilities vary with abilities
possibility; in a context in which you cannot swim, this possibility is ruled out. So the
live possibilities can be determined in part by a set of actions. With the assumption that
making an inference is a type of action,19 the value of the live possibilities parameter
can depend in part on which inferences the agent can make (Fig. 1).
We will also make the standard assumption that when ‘ought’ occurs in the conse-
quent of a conditional, the antecedent of the conditional is added to the modal base.
Consider ‘if S believes P then S ought to believe Q’. The ‘ought’ has a modal base
which includes ‘S believes P’. We can make this explicit e.g. ‘if S believes P then S
ought-given-S-believes-P to believe Q’.
3.2 Standard
The second parameter is a standard or goal which determines an ordering of the live
possible worlds. Plausibly, ‘S ought to A’ is true iff S A’s in every live world at the top
of the ranking.20
The standard need not be one that the subject cares about.21 If I say ‘you ought to
start with the cutlery on the outer edge’, the standard might be the rules of etiquette.
The more explicit sentence is ‘by standards of etiquette, you ought to start with the
cutlery on the outer edge’. This sentence can remain true even if you don’t care about
etiquette. This allows us to say to the psychopath ‘you shouldn’t kill people’; the full
sentence is ‘by standards of morality, you shouldn’t kill people’, and this is true even
if the psychopath doesn’t care about morality.22
For our purposes we only need to distinguish two standards: those corresponding to
the epistemic ought and the practical ought.23 We can get a grip on the epistemic ought
19 Some disagree. For example, Ram Neta holds that ‘every inference is simply a judgment with a certain
kind of content’ (2013: 404). If so, the second reason for including actions among the possibilities does not
apply.
20 Kratzer’s (1981) semantics provides an ordering of worlds. However, the ordering of worlds can be
changed by a change in information (Kolodny and MacFarlane 2010). So I prefer to use a standard, which
is plausibly more fundamental than the ordering.
21 This corresponds to a normative rather than a teleological interpretation of the associated norm (Shah
2003; Fassio 2019).
22 See Sinnott-Armstrong (2014).
23 I will assume for simplicity that each is associated with a unique standard.
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by thinking about contexts where the conversation concerns some epistemic standard
such as having true beliefs. Typical sentences might be ‘you ought to be uncertain’ or
‘we ought to expect defeat’.
Again, the standard need not be one that the subject cares about, so we need not
assume that agents care about any epistemic goals. For example, someone who is told
how a film ends ought (in the epistemic sense) to believe what they are told, even if
they do not care how it ends, and even if they don’t want to know how it ends.24 The
full sentence might be ‘by epistemic standards, you should believe that this is how the
film ends’.
There is disagreement about what the epistemic standard is. Leading contenders
for epistemic standards include having beliefs that are (a) true (b) justified (c) knowl-
edge.2526 The differences between these positions won’t matter here, so I will remain
neutral. And we can remain neutral on whether the standard (e.g. truth) is constitutive
of belief or whether something can be a belief without having such a standard.27
This brings us to the practical ought.28 We can get a grip on the practical ought by
thinking about normal contexts where the conversation concerns what is best to do.
Typical sentences might be ‘you ought to stay in school’ or ‘should I boil or steam
the vegetables?’. Call the standard associated with the practical ought the practical
standard.
There is disagreement about what the practical standard is. Humeans hold that the
practical standard is a function of one’s desires e.g. the standard might be to maximize
a weighted set of desires. Non-Humeans might hold that the practical standard is to
maximize value. There are further debates about whether the practical standard is to
maximize actual value or expected value, and whether expected value is determined
by beliefs or evidence.29 We can remain neutral on these issues.30
We can also remain neutral onwhether there are further parameterswhich determine
the content beyond standards and propositions. For example, Carr (2015) argues that
‘ought’ must be relativized to a decision rule. This may be so, but it will not play a
role below.
24 See Kelly (2003).
25 See Chignell (2018).
26 I set aside epistemic norm pluralism (Hughes 2017; Kopec 2018).
27 See Wedgwood (2002), Boghossian (2003)
28 See Williams (1965), Harman (1973) and Geach (1982), Broome (2013, pp. 12–24), and Schroeder
(2011), Kiesewetter (2017, Sect. 1.2.3).
29 See Kiesewetter (2017, ch. 8) for a helpful overview and further references.
30 We can also remain neutral on whether there is a metaphysically privileged normative ‘ought’ which
expresses genuine normative authority. Worsnip writes:
“we should be careful to separate the question of whether (e.g.) the law …has genuine normative
authority from whether there is a robustly normative usage of the legal ‘ought’. The former requires the law
to actually possess normative authority, whereas the latter only requires there to be speakers who take the
law to possess normative authority. So even if only a handful of the above ‘oughts’ reflect a genuine source
of normativity, many more of them might nevertheless be robustly normative usages of ‘ought’.” (Worsnip
2019a, page numbers not yet available; see also Worsnip 2020)
The former question is metaphysical, the latter is semantic. We need only make the latter assumption
that there are robustly normative usages of ‘ought’.
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Now we have this machinery on the table, I will argue that the problems regarding
the norms of reasoning can be resolved. There are numerous precisifications of the
Strong Normativity Thesis, some of which are true and some of which are false.
4 Objection from belief revision
Suppose S believes P, believes P entails Q, but S has strong evidence against Q. It
seems that S should not come to believe Q. But this is difficult to accommodate if our
principle has a claim in the consequent about what the agent should believe e.g.
Strong Normativity Thesis
For all agents S, and propositions P and Q:
If P entails Q, and S believes P, then S ought to believe Q
This is the problem of belief revision.31
To solve this problem (and the next) we need to distinguish the normative status of
a belief from the normative status of an inference. Crucially, an agent can make a good
inference from a bad (e.g. unjustified) belief.32 Our question concerns reasoning, so
we want to bracket the question of whether the initial belief was justified and focus
on the question of whether the inference was good. So the solution to the problem of
belief revision is to say that the inference to Q is good but the belief that Q is not.
What role does contextualism play here? It helps specify a modal base relative
to which the inference is good. So we modify the Strong Normativity Thesis in two
ways—we replace ‘believe’ with ‘infer’ and we make explicit the modal base:
Modified Strong Normativity Thesis
For all agents S, and propositions P and Q:
If P entails Q, and S believes P, then S ought-given-P-entails-Q-and-S-believes-P
to infer Q
This allows us to judge that the inference to Q is good qua inference, while remaining
neutral on the epistemic status of the initial belief that P, and consequently remaining
neutral on the epistemic status of a belief that Q.
Someone might object that it is overall justification for the belief that Q that we
are really interested in. If so, an account that brackets the rest of an agent’s epistemic
states is unhelpful.
The first response is to flat-footedly reply that our question is about reasoning, not
belief. But even if our concernwere about overall justification of belief, our framework
would be helpful—we would just have to identify some initial epistemic state (e.g.
basic beliefs, or evidence33), then plug in the agent’s total initial epistemic state for P:
31 One response is to weaken the consequent from the obligation operator to the permissible operator
(Broome 2013, p. 219). Another is to endorse wide scope norms (Broome 1999).
32 See Broome (1999, pp. 418–419) ‘In your reasoning, you can take as premises beliefs and intentions you
have no reason to have, and even beliefs and intentions you ought not to have. The nature of your reasoning
is unaffected by whether or not you ought to have the beliefs and intentions it is premised on.’
33 For basic beliefs see BonJour (1985), for evidence see Feldman and Conee (1985).
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Modified Strong Total Normativity Thesis
For all agents S, and propositions P and Q:
If S’s initial-epistemic-state entails Q, then S ought-given-S’s-initial-epistemic-
state to believe Q
So this reasoning framework can be placed into a bigger story about rational belief.
But rational belief raises numerous tricky issues such as internalism, defeaters and
inductive reasoning which go beyond the scope of this paper.
Terminology: In future, rather than repeating the whole antecedent appended to
‘ought’, I will just write ‘oughtA’.
5 The preface paradox
In this section I will argue that the same response, that of relativizing ‘ought’ to a
possibilities parameter, solves the preface paradox:
Preface Paradox
Suppose S rationally believes each of the assertions in his book, P1, P2…Pn. Let
Q stand for the conjunction, P1 & P2…&Pn. Since the author regards himself
as fallible, he should not believe the conjunction of all his assertions (Q).
Thus S believes P1, P2…Pn and that they entail Q, but S should not believe Q. The
problem is usually taken to be that of explaining why the author should not make the
inference to Q.
But there is a sense in which the author should make the inference. If we move
from talk of belief to talk of inferences, and set the live possibilities parameter to the
proposition that S rationally believes P1, P2…Pn, then we can hold that the inference
to Q is correct after all:
Modified Strong Normativity Thesis
For all agents S, and propositions P and Q:
If P entails Q, and S believes P, then S oughtA to infer Q
So there is a sense in which S ought to infer Q.
Someone might object that this misses the point, arguing that the Preface Paradox
shows that the agent should not make the inference. But why not? The standard answer
begins with the observation that each of P1, P2…Pn has partial justification, and then
concludes that justification for Q might fall below some threshold.34
But the level of justification of each of P1, P2…Pn is not at issue. We are assessing
the deductive inference from P1, P2…Pn to Q (not the belief that Q) and thereby
setting aside the justificatory status of P1, P2…Pn. It is irrelevant whether each of P1,
P2…Pn has only partial justification, or is even completely unjustified. We are asking
whether it is correct to infer Q from the set of beliefs that P1, P2…Pn, and indeed it
is.
It might be useful to draw an analogy with Lewis’s (1980) Principal Principle.
Roughly, it says that an agent should have credence of x in P given that they are
34 See Worsnip (2019b) for discussion and references.
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rationally certain that the chance of P is x. If the agent is not rationally certain what
the chance is, then the Principal Principle says nothing directly about what the agent
should believe. Similarly, if the agent does not believe each of P1, P2…Pn then the
Modified Strong Normativity Thesis says nothing directly about what the agent should
believe. In fact the Modified Strong Normativity Thesis never says anything directly
about what an agent should believe. It just says that given the set of beliefs P1, P2…Pn
they should infer Q.
6 Excessive demands
The problem of excessive demands is that we sometimes cannot work out the conse-
quences of our beliefs. All the theorems of mathematics follow from our beliefs about
arithmetic, but surely we are not required to infer them.
This conflict between logic and the norms of reasoning can be resolved by again
invoking the live possibilities parameter. Above we used the belief part of the live pos-
sibilities; here we use the actions part of the live possibilities, invoking the assumption
that an inference is a type of action.
From any belief there are an infinite number of valid inferences that could be
made, of which some are simple and some are complicated. Let’s first focus on the
infinite set of valid inferences. There is a sense of ‘ought’ which includes all valid
inferences in the possibilities parameter. (Bayesians will be familiar with this, as it is
what ‘rational’ usually means in the Bayesian literature.35) We can make this ideally
rational ‘ought’ explicit by using ‘ought-rationally’. And we can make explicit the
sense of ‘ought’ which is limited to inferences some particular agent is able to make
with ‘ought-actually’. We get a false principle if we combine ought-actually with all
the valid inferences:
False Requirement (FR)
For all agents S, and propositions P and Q:
If P entails Q, and S believes P, then S oughtA-actually to infer Q
This implies that S ought-actually to believe all theorems of mathematics. This is the
root of the problem of excessive demands.
But the objection is side-stepped if we use ought-rationally:
Rational requirement (RR)
For all agents S, and propositions P and Q:
If P entails Q, and S believes P, then S oughtA-rationally to infer Q36
35 For a recent paper on this topic, see Jackson (2018). Do not confuse this idealized ought with that used
in defences of the truth norm of belief (see McHugh 2012), which I suggest is the sense of ought relativized
to full information in the modal base.
36 MacFarlane (ms) seems to have this in mind when he writes: ‘We seek logical knowledge so that we will
know how we ought to revise our beliefs: not just how we will be obligated to revise them when we acquire
this logical knowledge, but how we are obligated to revise them even now, in our state of ignorance.’ p. 12.
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The objection is also side-stepped if we use ought-actually and add to the antecedent
that the inferences are those S is able to make, which we can call ‘S-available infer-
ences’.
Non-rational requirement (NR)
For all agents S, and propositions P and Q:
If P entails Q, and S believes P, and P supports Q via-S-available-inferences,
then S oughtA-actually to infer Q
Thus the live possibilities parameter solves the problem of excessive demands by
providing a reading of the Strong Normativity Thesis on which one is not required
to infer all the theorems of mathematics (NR), and it also explains the intuition that
there is a sense in which you should infer all the theorems of mathematics (RR).
To fill this out, we can imagine three different sentences which can be inferred from
P.
Q1: An obvious inference that any reasoner can make
Q2: A difficult inference that a logic student can make
Q3: A superhuman inference that no human can make
Let w3 be the world where S infers Q3, Q2 and Q1; let w2 be the world where S
infers Q2 and Q1; and let w1 be the world where S infers only Q1. Worlds are ordered
(vertically) by how well they achieve the epistemic goal (Fig. 2).
Not live for humans
Best (epistemic)





Fig. 2 Three worlds in which increasingly complex inferences are made
Agents ought to make true the best live world. Relative to ought-rationally, S ought
to make w3 true. But if w3 is not live then S ought-actually make only w2 true. And
if S is unable to do difficult logical reasoning then only w1 is live.
One complication concerns which inferences the agent is able to make, as there
is some flexibility about what is held constant. Suppose the agent is tired, and this
restricts the inferences they do make. What should we hold fixed when assessing what
inferences they are able to make? If we hold fixed that the agent is tired, we will get
one set of available inferences. If we allow them a nap we will get a bigger set of




I don’t want to take a stand on this, a topic which has been discussed in the literature
on ought-implies-can.37 I suspect that ‘able’ is also context-sensitive, which would
make ‘available inferences’ context-sensitive. And any vagueness in ‘available’ will
be matched by vagueness in ‘ought’. The truth of NR just requires that the demands
of ought-actually do not extend beyond the available inferences.38
We have explained how excessive demandingness can be avoided by positing the
relatively undemanding norm of NR. But we’ll see that NRmight still be too demand-
ing.
7 Clutter avoidance
NR (and RR) still face the problem of clutter avoidance. They seem to imply that I
am obligated to believe all of the infinitely many trivial logical consequences of my
beliefs. This looks implausible. Steinberger (2019, p. 11) writes:
Not only do I not care about, say, the disjunction ‘I am wearing blue socks or
Elvis Presley was an alien’ entailed by my true belief that I am wearing blue
socks, it would be positively irrational for me to squander my meagre cognitive
resources on inferring trivial implications of my beliefs that are of no value to
my goals.
Many philosophers have concluded that there must be a no-clutter norm,39 but these
cause serious problems.40
I think the problem of clutter avoidance can be solved by invoking the parameter
of the standard. I will argue that in normal contexts you ought not to make trivial
inferences, yet we can identify contexts in which you should make trivial inferences.
The sense of ‘ought’ in which you ought to infer all the trivial logical consequences
of your beliefs is the epistemic sense (e.g. the standard of having all and only true
beliefs).41 We can make this parameter value explicit with ‘epistemically-ought’:
Non-rational Epistemic-Requirement (NER)
For all agents S, and propositions P and Q:
If P entails Q, and S believes P, and P supports Q via-S-available-inferences,
then S epistemically-oughtA-actually to infer Q
37 See Frankena (1958) and Schwarz (2020) for a contextualist account of ‘can’.
38 Someone might object that this is trivial or analytically true. Yes. We are trying to find true principles
which vindicate the intuitions behind plausible but overly strong principles. We should expect some of these
true principles to be trivial or analytic.
39 See Harman (1986) Goldman (1986), Christensen (1994), Williamson (1998), Ryan (1999), Feldman
(2000), Wallace (2001), Sainsbury (2002), DePaul (2004), MacFarlane (2004), White (2005), Field (2009),
Douven (2010) and Wedgwood (2012).
40 See Friedman (2017).
41 Recallwe can remain neutral onwhat exactly the epistemic standard is e.g. truth, knowledge, justification;
relative to the standard of truth, or knowledge or justification, I ought to believe ‘I am wearing blue socks
or Elvis Presley was an alien’.
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(I used available inferences and ‘oughtA-actually’. For completeness, note that the
‘rationalized’ version is also true, where we remove the restrictions to available infer-
ences:
Rational Epistemic-Requirement (RER)
For all agents S, and propositions P and Q:
If P entails Q, and S believes P, then S epistemically-oughtA-rationally to infer
Q)
If NER and RER seem implausible, it might be because for humans there is always
some cost in time, energy or computing power to making an inference. But imagine a
creature for whom there was no cost e.g. angels with infinite computing power. If they
are at all interested in truth, knowledge or justification, then theywould instantaneously
make all the inferences from their beliefs. And we could explain the rationality of their
doing so in terms of the epistemic ought. Although humans are not like this, I think it
is natural to invoke such ideals.
For further support, Christensen (2004, pp. 165–166) gives the following example:
Efficiency seems to enter into the evaluation of car designs in a fairly simple
way: the more efficient a car is, the better. Now suppose someone objected to
this characterization as follows: “Your evaluative scheme imposes an unrealistic
standard. Are you trying to tell me that the Toyota Prius hybrid, at 49 mpg, is
an “inefficient” car? On your view, the very best car would use no energy at all!
But this is technologically impossible…the very laws of physics forbid it!”
Christensen points out that this objection fails to undermine our ideal of efficiency,
concluding that there is room for unattainable ideals even in the most pragmatic
endeavours, and that we can recognize the normative force of ideals whose realization
is far beyond human capacities.42
Moving on, the sense of ‘ought’ in which it is not the case that you ought to infer
all the trivial logical consequences of your beliefs is the practical sense:
False Practical-requirement (FPR)
For all agents S, and propositions P and Q:
If P entails Q, and S believes P, and P supports Q via-S-available-inferences,
then S practically-oughtA-actually to infer Q43
As long as S has limited cognitive capacity and reasons to do things other than believe
truths (e.g. to eat, to reproduce) as all known agents do, then FPR will have counterex-
amples. The problems of clutter avoidance involve such counter-examples. ,4445
42 This sentence borrows from Christensen’s phrasing on p. 165 and p. 167.
43 This might be true using practically-ought-rationally, if ideally rational agents can make every inference
instantly with no cost. But my point is that we can find a reading which vindicates the intuitions behind the
no-clutter objection.
44 McHugh and Way (2018) makes a similar point in terms of attributive uses of ‘good’: ‘Any ‘intuition’
we have that such beliefs are worthless is likely to concern some form of goodness [all things considered]
rather than goodness qua [belief i.e. epistemic goodness]’ p. 24.
45 It remains an open question what you practically-ought to believe—which inferences practically-should








Fig. 3 Worlds re-ordered by the practical goal
We can see in Fig. 3 that relative to the practical standard, the best world could be
w1, where only obvious inferences are made and the agent can spend their resources
doing something else.
For practical ought claims to be true, the agent must have practical goals such that
it is worth making the inferences. So the true norm is something like:
Non-rational Practical-requirement (NPR)
For all agents S, and propositions P and Q:
If P entails Q, and S believes P, and P supports Q via-S-available-inferences, and
it is worth S making the inferences then S practically- oughtA-actually to infer
Q
(For completeness, note that the ‘rationalized’ version is also true, wherewe remove
the restrictions to available inferences:
Rational Practical-requirement (RPR)
For all agents S, and propositions P and Q:
If P entails Q, and S believes P, and it is worth S making the inference then S
practically-oughtA-rationally to infer Q)
I suggest that NER, RER, NPR and RPR express the link between logic and reasoning.
8 Ideals, guidance, appraisal
Norms can be used for i) expressing ideals, ii) for guidance and iii) for making
appraisals.46 But different norms seem to be required for each role. I want to show
that our intuitions about the divergence of norms for ideals, guidance and appraisal
can be accounted for by the two parameters.
Footnote 45 continued
this standard in your situation (e.g. fulfil desires for Humeans, maximize value for non-Humeans etc.) We
should not expect general answers to these questions.
46 This is the focus of Steinberger (Steinberger 2019a). Compare Kiesewetter (2017, p. 13) who dis-
tinguishes first-person guidance, second-person advice and third-person criticism. I suggest that talk of





Let’s start with ideals, which are closely related to standards. Think of the ideal norm
as expressing the best way of achieving a given standard, making no allowance for
any limitations of an agent or other standards the agent might have. We’ll focus on
the epistemic standard e.g. believing all and only truths, so the relevant ought is
epistemic-ought. As any limitations of the agent are irrelevant for the ideal norm, we
need ought-rationally. Putting this together the ideal norm is:
Rational Epistemic-Requirement (RER)47
For all agents S, and propositions P and Q:
If P entails Q, and S believes P, then S epistemically-oughtA-rationally to infer
Q
For precedent, compare the utilitarian thesis that an act is right if and only if it max-
imizes happiness. Faced with the objection that this norm fails to provide guidance,
utilitarians can maintain that their principle expresses the ideal norm relative to the
moral standard, even if we cannot always follow it.48
There is a controversy worth mentioning before we go further. What is ideal rea-
soning for an agent who falsely believes that the relevant rule is invalid? For example,
suppose S has been told by a confused teaching assistant that modus ponens is invalid.
This is misleading higher order evidence. Should agents reason in line with their
false beliefs? Some say no, that misleading higher order evidence should be ignored
in first-order reasoning (level-splitters and right reasons theorists49). Others say yes
(conciliationists). There is an analogous debate in ethics. Some hold that those with
misleading higher order evidence about the ethical rules should (morally) ignore that
misleading higher order evidence.5051
I have my own views on this controversy (Bradley 2019), but this framework allows
us to remain neutral. At the end of Sect. 4 I argued that we can bracket the rest of
the agent’s epistemic states, and in particular the question of whether P is justified,
and focus on the inference from P to Q. Similarly, we can bracket any of the agent’s
epistemic states that might defeat the inference i.e. make the inference from P to Q
incorrect. The advice of a confused teacher would thereby be bracketed. Thus, I leave
open the question of how, if at all, contextualism interacts with the debate about higher
level evidence.
47 One possible counter-example is an epistemic Pascal’s wager, where the agent will be rewarded with
lots of true beliefs if they fail to infer Q (Berker 2013). I set these cases aside here and address them in (ms).
48 See Bales (1971), Railton (1984), Jackson (1991).
49 See Horowitz (2014).
50 Compare Harman (2011).
51 Whatever line you take here will filter down to norms of guidance and appraisal. For example, if the
ideal is that misleading higher order evidence is to be taken into account in first-order reasoning, then it
is natural to judge agents who do not take it into account epistemically criticism-worthy. And if the ideal
is that misleading higher order evidence is not to be taken into account in first-order reasoning, then it is
natural to judge agents who do take it into account epistemically criticism-worthy. And there is room for
mixed verdicts. One might hold that the ideal says that misleading higher order evidence is not to be taken
into account in first-order reasoning, but agents who do are excused i.e. not criticism-worthy.
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Whatever the ideal is, we can now ask how the norms of guidance and appraisal
diverge from it.
8.2 Guidance
We expect that agents can be guided by norms, but ideal norms cannot always serve
as norms of guidance. For example, a norm might say ‘if the exam asks for the capital
of Portugal, then write ‘Lisbon”. This expresses the ideal, but cannot guide an agent
who doesn’t know it. (Perhaps better: Doesn’t believe it). In ethics, utilitarians accept
that their theory needs to say something about guidance, and they offer norms that can
be used to guide e.g. maximize expected utility. In both cases, the natural solution is
to hold that norms which can guide agents are restricted to refer only to beliefs and
abilities the agent has.
Let’s again focus on the epistemic standard. S can only be guided by inferences
available to S, so I suggest that the guidance norm is:
Non-rational Epistemic-Requirement (NER)
For all agents S, and propositions P and Q:
If P entails Q, and S believes P, and P supports Q via-S-available-inferences,
then S epistemically-oughtA-actually to infer Q.
8.3 Appraisal
What is it to be blameworthy for violating an epistemic norm?52 Here is a useful
principle adapted from Kauppinen (2018):
Epistemic Blameworthiness
S is blameworthy for violating an epistemic norm if and only if it appropriate,
other things being equal, to hold the subject accountable by reducing epistemic
trust, insofar as she lacks an excuse.
I’m going to assume thatEpistemic Blameworthiness is roughly correct.My aim in this
section is to map our intuitions about what counts as an excuse onto the contextualist
framework.
52 See Steinberger (2019a, p. 17) for more on the epistemic sense of appraisal e.g. ‘Appraisals are central
to our normative practices. As normatively regulating and regulated beings, we constantly hold each other
accountable for what we do, intend or believe. This is true in the theoretical as much as in the practical arena.
In particular, we appraise our epistemic peers in order to assess their character as inquirers. A conscientious
reasoner is generally a trustworthy source of testimony. In arriving at such assessments, we frequently care
about more than merely an evaluation of their beliefs as correct or mistaken. After all, knowing that my
peer arrived at a mistaken belief not out of irresponsible doxastic conduct, but out of sheer bad luck and
despite having discharged her epistemic obligations, is valuable information in forming an opinion about
her epistemic character.’ See also Smith (2005), McCormick (2011), McHugh (2013) and Brown (2020).
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Distinguish two types of excuse for failing to make a valid inference.53Agents can
be excused by being unable to make the inference, or by having no sufficiently good
reason to make the inference. These excuses correspond to the two parameters. Let’s
go through them. (I leave open that there might be other types of excuses. I give
sufficiency conditions for excuses. Blameworthiness requires no excuses, so I give
necessary conditions on blameworthiness.54)
First, S might be unable55 to make the inference because it is too complicated, and
could thereby be excused.56 In the contextualist framework, they still infer as they
ought-actually to. So if the inference they fail to make is not one they ought-actually
to make then they have an excuse.
A complication is that we might reduce our epistemic trust in an agent precisely
because they are unable to make the valid inference. For example, it might be an
inference that we can make, and which we expect others to make, so S’s inability to
make that inference reduces our epistemic trust in S. The effect of this complication
is to expand the live possible worlds to an intermediate level. For example, consider
an agent who can only infer Q1, producing w1. Although they cannot infer Q2 and
thereby produce w2, we expect them to be able to, while we do not expect them to
infer Q3 and produce w3. So the best live world is w2, and S ought to produce it. Call
this middling sense ‘ought-competently’. S might fail to infer Q3, but if S infers as
they ought-competently then they have an excuse (Fig. 4).57
Second, S might have no sufficiently good reason to make the inference (because S
has non-epistemic goals), and would thereby be excused. In the contextualist frame-
work, they still infer as they practically-ought to. Once non-epistemic goals are added,
the ordering of worlds can change, and the best world might be one in which the agent
does not make the inference e.g. when the inference is trivial. In Fig. 5, S would be
excused for failing to arrive at w2, as the best world is w1; in failing to arrive at w2
or w3, S infers as she practically-ought to. So if the inference they fail to make is not
one they practically-ought to make then they have an excuse.
53 Can there be an epistemic excuse for making an invalid inference? This raises epistemic Pascal’s Wager
issues which I set aside here.
54 A plausible further necessary condition is that the speaker endorses the standard (Worsnip 2019a).
55 Mapping to the debate about epistemic conditions on responsibility, this might be equivalent to the
‘control condition’ (Rudy-Hiller 2018).
56 Perhaps some inferences could always be made. If all agents are able to infer according to modus ponens
then we get what Broome (2000) calls ‘strict liability’ for simple logical relations: “The relation between
believing p and believing q [a logical consequence of p] is strict. If you believe p but not q, you are definitely
not entirely as you ought to be” (85). With a more complicated inference which an agent cannot make,
perhaps they ought to have been able to make the inference e.g. perhaps they should have taken a logic
course. (This is the ‘tracing condition’; see Vargas 2005). Then they might be blameworthy for not taking
the logic course, and they might be blameworthy for the downstream consequences e.g. being unable to
make the inference. It seems to me that consideration of such facts creates a context in which it is true to
say that they could have made the inference. .
57 Perhaps a similar point applies to forgetting. If S forgets p then they are unable to believe/infer that p.
We would reduce our trust in them only if we expect them to remember p.
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Fig. 5 Worlds re-ordered by the practical goal
Putting these together, if the inference they fail to make is either not one they
practically-ought to make or not one they ought-competently make, then they have
an excuse. Contrapositively, if agents are blameworthy for failing to make a valid
inference then they fail to infer as they practically-ought-competently. So the norm of
blame for reasoning is:
Non-rational Practical-Requirement+ (NPR+)58
For all agents S, and propositions P and Q:
If P entails Q, and S believes P, and P supports Q via-S-competent-inferences,
and it is worth S making the inferences,
then S practically-oughtA-competently to infer Q
58 I’ve added + because ‘competently’ has been introduced instead of ‘actually’.
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All valid inferences from a set of beliefs
Inferences agent is blameworthy for not making i.e. inferences agent practically-ought-
competently to make
Inferences agent has 
sufficient practical 
reason to make
Inferences agent is 
able (or expected to be 
able) to make
Fig. 6 A Way to be Epistemically Blameworthy
Let’s try a case:
Melted Ice-cream
Alessandra has gone to pick up her children at their elementary school. It is hot,
but she leaves the ice-cream she has brought for her children in the car. Although
able to infer that the ice-cream will melt, she does not do so. By the time they
return the ice-cream has melted.59
Intuitively, Alessandra is epistemically blameworthy. We would reduce our epistemic
trust in Alessandra if we learnt that she failed to realize that the ice-cream would
melt. Our framework delivers this verdict if the inference to the belief that the ice-
cream would melt is one she is both able to make and has sufficient practical reason
to make. And indeed both conditions are satisfied. Alessandra has enough inferential
competence to be able to work out that the ice-cream would melt, and has sufficient
practical interest in the ice-cream not melting.60 She practically-ought-competently
to have inferred that the ice-cream would melt, but she does not, so is epistemically
blameworthy (Fig. 6).
Alessandra is excused if we make either of two modifications to the story. If we
modify the story to one in which her full attention on something other than the ice-
cream is a matter of life and death then Alessandra is not epistemically blameworthy.
For example, suppose she is a doctor and as she parks she sees that there has been an
accident and only her full attention for several hours will save the life of a child. In
such a context, a melting ice-cream is trivial in the same sense that it is trivial to infer
that I am wearing blue socks or Elvis is alive. She does not have practical reason to
make the inference, so is not blameworthy.61
Alessandra is also excused if the inference to the belief that the ice-cream would
melt is not one she is able to make, nor one we would expect her to make. This requires
a bit more imagination, but we could imagine that it is a typically cold day in the Arctic
59 Adapted from Sher (2009, p. 24). I’ve changed the dog to an ice-cream to take morality out of it.
60 Compare Lillehammer (2019).
61 See Schroeder (2012) for related examples where there is good reason not to deliberate. Similar issues
arise for the question of when it is rational to reconsider a belief (see Paul 2015). Fragmented agents




Circle where the ice-cream would normally not melt, but the car is parked in a place
where heat from concave neighbouring buildings is focussed. Alessandra knows the
contingent facts, but does not have the mathematical abilities necessary to work out
that the ice-cream would melt. She ought-rationally to make the inference, but we
would not expect her to be able to make the inference, so she is not blameworthy.
9 Conclusion
I have argued that many controversies about the norms of reasoning can be resolved
by an independently motivated contextualist semantics for ‘ought’. The problems
of belief revision and the preface paradox can be solved by relativizing to a set of
propositions, the problem of excessive demands can be solved by relativizing to a
set of available inferences, and the problem of clutter avoidance can be solved by
relativizing to a standard. These parameters can also illuminate questions about which
norms are relevant to ideals, guidance, and blame.62
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